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This battle seemed to inch forward, with each army
tensely aware of the other, a nervous dance for position
and then an explosion of relentless, unmitigated butchery
where victory teetered in the balance right up to the
final shot.
Our battleplan was to first concentrate our forces,
then attack all out. This strategy hinged on a consolidation
of the 1st and 2nd divisions on the hill above the Stone
Bridge. This required our first division to arrive on
the field, the 2nd, to move swiftly to that hill, to
be in a position to both safeguard the crossing by the
other division and to shell defenders on the east side
of Henry Hill.
The enemy pushed his forward brigades far to the north
in an apparent attempt to disrupt the 2nd Division's
advance. Instead, Bartow's brigade walked into a quick
encirclement. After receiving fire from all sides, Bartow
took the sensible course and surrendered his brigade,
preferring life with a loser's reputation over death
with glory. They don't teach that at war college.
The battle settled into a rather quiet period as Ekrommen
(other Union player) assembled his force on the hill
above the bridge. The enemy aligned Cocke's and Jackson's
brigades along the east slope of Henry Hill to oppose
him. We saw an opportunity. It seemed that the left
end of the Cocke-Jackson line was vulnerable and could
be destroyed. I moved up the 3rd Division and just as
we were about to hit them front and flank, the enemy
withdrew southward down the spine of Henry Hill. Frustrated,
we went ahead and tried to rush them. Their lines weakened
but did not break.
Our 2nd Division was spent and was pulled back out
of the action. I launched a limited attack by the 3rd
Division on Cocke's brigade hoping to either rout it
or entice Jackson to advance to counterattack, which
would expose him to severe artillery fire from a formidable
grand battery Ekrommen had assembled on the hill overlooking
Young's Branch.
Neither happened. Instead, the enemy's lines weakened
further yet held, then withdrew southward again, slipping
out of our grasp like a greased pig, this time to form
an L-shaped line with the angle along the highest part
of Henry Hill. In the hex that formed the angle, the
enemy maintained a fragment of infantry and 3 batteries.
I concluded that this hex was the key to their whole
line, that if those 3 batteries could be swamped or
routed, their whole line would disintegrate. I, therefore,
advocated a frontal assault on the artillery to my partner
and he agreed with the assessment. We now had all 3
divisions on hand and had completed our concentration.
We were compact and massed and ready to strike.
And strike we did. Again and again in the final hours.
And always the primary target of our attacks was the
hex containing the 3 batteries.
Our blue lines pressed forward. The 1st Division splashed
across Young's Branch and smashed squarely into Jackson's
tired line, which held briefly, then broke. Unfortunately,
the impetus of pursuit steered two of our best brigades
to the south, away from the objective.
Further up Henry Hill, Richardson's brigade plus all
of the 2nd and 3rd Divisions, pressed up the slope toward
those guns. Rows of men went down. At one point, the
rebel batteries had no infantry left to support them,
but our units stalled, stunned by the carnage, and failed
to seize the opportunity. Each side witnessed brigades
vanish, victims to the sheer volume of musketry and
canister. Incredibly, the batteries held to the end.
In the very final push, Richardson's brigade routed
Kershaw from part of the objective area. Had Richardson
moved into that hex, we would have won. But instead
he went in pursuit of the shell shocked Ewell and missed
the opportunity. Likewise, General Heintzelman took
personal command of his freshest brigade to storm those
3 batteries. For reasons yet to be explained by the
commander, General Heintzelman (soon to be colonel)
failed to order the assault. Instead, he stood pat as
the last bit of sunlight faded, taking with it our brief
chance to claim outright victory at Bull Run.
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